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Is the Privilege of Private Discrimination 
an Artifact of an Icon? 
DONALD A. DRIPPS* 
Professor Zwolinski poses a thoughtful challenge to the law’s distinct 
responses to private and commercial discrimination along the lines of 
race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, disability, age, and so on.1  He 
considers three plausible explanations for the privileged status of private 
discrimination: (1) private discrimination is harder to detect; (2) private 
discrimination is less harmful; and (3) private discrimination is morally 
authorized by personal autonomy.2  Carefully analyzing each candidate, 
he rejects them all, concluding that the legal treatment of private and 
commercial discrimination ought to be more closely aligned.3  He remains 
noncommittal on whether the right to discriminate in employment and 
housing ought to be broadened, or whether the right to discriminate in 
choosing friends, roommates, club members, dates, and so on ought to 
be narrowed. 
Most of what Professor Zwolinski says about the three plausible 
grounds for private discrimination’s privileged position seems to me 
persuasive.  I do, however, offer three observations about the prospects 
of justifying the prevailing distinction.  First, as a methodological 
matter, there are many settled rules and institutions that are, from the 
standpoint of moral theory, not quite justified by any single normative 
theory.  They may, however, be justified pragmatically, when they are 
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nearly justified by several reasons.  The imperfect fit between the rule or 
practice and morally justified outcomes in all the cases covered by the 
rule or practice may then be of less concern, especially if the cost of 
more discriminating alternative rules or practices is likely to be high. 
Second, an attempt to redistribute the goods now distributed by 
persons exercising the privilege of private discrimination is normatively 
problematic.  Those currently receiving these goods are usually innocent, so 
the loss to the victim of discrimination is a gain to another, unmerited in 
some sense, but still a gain.  And it may well be impossible to transfer 
that same good to someone else who, in some sense, merits it.  The 
government can force A to admit B to A’s golf club, but it cannot make A 
like or respect B. 
Third, the privilege for private discrimination indeed tends to track a 
widely-felt sense that autonomy has special value in some spheres of 
human life.  Throughout the developed world, freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, and sexual privacy enjoy more respect, legally and 
socially, than the right to contract, to own weapons, or to consume 
intoxicants.  This hierarchy of liberties may turn out to be arbitrary, but 
it prevails so widely that I would be slow to assume that it is.  The 
privileged liberties turn out to protect the same zones of life that enjoy 
the privilege of private discrimination. 
I. 
Suppose we reconsider the legal regulation of discrimination as a 
choice between a rule and a standard.  The rule provides: “Discrimination 
based on familiar identity markers in commercial transaction is prohibited.  
Discrimination based on familiar identity markers in noncommercial, 
private transactions is permitted.”  The standard provides: “Wrongful 
discrimination based on familiar identity markers is prohibited, in both 
the commercial and the private context.” 
The standard is fully or completely justified in the sense that, when 
properly applied, it will always produce the right result.  Yet it is a familiar 
lesson of legal theory that rules are sometimes preferable to standards.4  
The case for rules is strongest when the system expects to adjudicate a 
large number of cases, when regulated actors have a legitimate need for 
clear and prospective guidance on the law’s demands, when the available 
remedies for violations discovered ex post are costly or imperfect, and 
 4. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S. 
Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
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when it is difficult to make accurate assessments of the specific facts that 
would inform the application of a standard to particular cases. 
Professor Zwolinski is right when he says that the law regulates some 
aspects of private life, like drug use, that some private discrimination is 
open and notorious, and that some commercial discrimination is hard to 
prove.5  I am willing to assume that some private discrimination has 
more baleful consequences than some commercial discrimination.6  I am 
not convinced that these claims exclude a case for the rule previously 
described. 
Much private discrimination is invisible; one is not informed of invitations 
withheld.  Most of the goods withheld are modest.  I would be the last to 
question the value of a good party or a roll in the hay, but I think it also 
clear that they have lesser life consequences than university admissions, 
job offers, and mortgage availability.  Discriminatory exclusion from 
long-term relationships, marriage included, is a special case about which 
I shall say more presently. 
If a legal system were to attempt enforcement of a prohibition on private 
discrimination, it would need to craft a remedial system based on private 
suit, publicly administered investigations, or both.  The potential number 
of claims is very large, and an accurate assessment of the relevant facts 
would be difficult.  “Why didn’t you go out with Jim?”  “Because he’s a 
dork.”  “Isn’t it true that you did go out with Joe?”  “Yes.”  “Isn’t it true that 
Joe is definitely a dork, but a white dork?”  “Joe is not a dork.  He’s a dweeb.  
There’s a difference.” 
Ironically, any enforcement mechanism invites discriminations along 
the lines of wealth and race.  The better educated and more well-off will 
have the knowledge and resources to sue.  Public investigations will not 
target upper class suspects.  If we are to analogize private discrimination 
and private drug use, we ought to acknowledge that enforcement of the 
laws against the latter have not been enforced with an even hand.7
Consider lying, a practice that is always prima facie wrong, but unlawful 
only when intended to induce detrimental reliance or when honesty is 
required for testimony, a securities disclosure, tax return, and so on.  No 
society makes lying as such a crime, and yet no society regards lying as 
a matter of moral indifference.  Some lies are easy to prove, and some 
 5. See Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 1047-48. 
 6. Id. at 1050-54. 
 7. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, 109-11 (1995). 




are quite harmful.  On the whole, however, a general legal prohibition on 
lying would do more harm than good. 
So I am not quite convinced by Professor Zwolinski’s critique of the 
epistemic and consequentialist distinctions.  It might be that, taken 
together, those considerations justify a categorical privilege for private 
discrimination, not because private discrimination is always unprovable 
or always of modest consequence, but because private discrimination is 
usually unprovable, often of modest consequence, and generally costly 
to remedy.  The rule will certainly produce some wrong results, but it 
might well produce fewer of them at lower cost than an attempt to 
implement the standard.  At the very least, reasonable persons might say 
that scarce resources for investigating wrong-doing might be better 
directed at graver evils such as sexual assault, domestic violence, child 
abuse, and so on. 
Professor Zwolinski makes the important point that law has a symbolic or 
rhetorical function, a significant function and perhaps its primary one.8  
To limit the reach of a prohibition to the realm of symbols, however, the 
system would have to prohibit private suits and rely exclusively on 
public authority.  Would a prohibition adopted with the explicit understanding 
that it exists just for show have the same symbolic power as other laws?  
The example of the sodomy laws is illustrative on this point.  The 
sodomy laws inflicted considerable harm when used to support civil-side 
discrimination in employment and family law.9  Whatever symbolic respect 
they ever had went out with their enforcement.  The Georgia statute upheld 
in Bowers v. Hardwick facially applied to heterosexual oral sex.10  This 
was rightly regarded as a joke, not a jeremiad. 
Symbolic laws, moreover, remain on the books and will be exploited 
by the authorities when the occasion arises.  Ban private discrimination 
as a symbolic matter, and just wait for a controversial judicial nomination.  
“Now, Judge Smithers, we understand that you’re a brilliant jurist.  I’m 
just a little troubled about the fact that you’ve never had a [insert racial, 
religious, or ethnic minority here] over for dinner.  That’s troubling 
enough, but as I’m sure you know, that’s been a crime since the passage 
 8. See Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 1048. 
 9. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by 
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 103, 136 (2000) (“[L]egislators, 
police officers, and judges all explicitly rely on the presumptive criminality of homosexual 
citizens to justify a wide range of official discrimination against gay men and lesbians.”). 
 10. 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986) (“A person commits the offense of sodomy when 
he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another. . . .”) (ellipsis in original) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 
(1984)). 
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of the Zwolinski Act. . . .”  Hypocrisy seems to be a permanent feature 
of the human condition, but the less of it we write into law, the better. 
II. 
When A withholds friendship, respect, or love from B, is it possible to 
compel A to extend these goods?  Some goods, to use Robert George’s 
term, are “reflexive”: 
Moral goods are “reflexive” in that they are reasons to choose which include 
choice in their very meaning; one cannot participate in these goods otherwise 
than by acts of choice, that is, internal acts of will, and the internal disposition 
established by such choices.  As internal acts, they are beyond legal compulsion.11
Friendship is surely such a good.  We say of the undercover informant 
that he is a “false friend,” that is, no friend at all, even though the 
suspect may subjectively experience the feeling of friendship with the 
informant. 
If friendship is such a good, so too is love.  To say that A does not love 
B because of B’s race or religion supposes that interpersonal criteria, 
accessible to observers, determine whom A loves and does not love.  If B 
meets these criteria but for B’s race, A’s failure to love B is discriminatory. 
Suppose, fantastically, that this kind of calculation could be made 
reliably enough for purposes of litigation.  Is it possible for A to love B, 
even if the cause of A’s inability is a predisposition A agrees is 
irrational?  Saying “A ought to love B” is like saying “A ought to flap his 
arms and fly.” 
The law should not command the impossible.  If we wish to send social 
signals to reduce discrimination in love or marriage, we might consider 
subsidies like double exemptions on taxes for interracial, interethnic, or 
interfaith marriages.  It makes more sense to reward love when it is 
lucky enough to be pro-social than to punish love when it is unlucky 
enough to mirror the society in which the lovers live. 
III. 
John Stuart Mill thought that the arguments justifying strong individual 
rights of conscience and expression also justified a much broader range 
of behavioral autonomy.12  On this point Mill has not yet prevailed.  
 11. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING  MEN  MORAL 43 (1993). 
 12. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 17 




Freedom of conscience and expression had a preferred position even in 
Mill’s time.  Today sexual autonomy has joined them throughout the 
modern world in the ranks of what are thought to be fundamental human 
rights.  Lawrence v. Texas is controversial only on the level of constitutional 
methodology;13 even Justice Thomas, who dissented, said the Texas law 
was “silly” and that he would vote to repeal it.14
The Court, however, has refused to recognize a constitutional right to 
physician-assisted suicide,15 or even a statutory right to use marijuana 
for medical purposes.16  The Court is not alone in seeing faith, speech, 
and sex as special enclaves of personal autonomy.  Indeed, in prevailing 
opinion and in U.S. law, speech, conscience, and sexuality hold their 
privileged status even when they cause harm,17 because the rights to 
speak, to believe, and to love deliver benefits in general and in the long 
run that outweigh what harms may follow. 
This hierarchy of preferred liberties closely tracks prevailing 
sentiments about the privilege of private discrimination.  In what cases 
do we insist most earnestly on the right to discriminate?  Nazis in 
Skokie; an all-male priesthood; and who goes to bed with whom.18  If 
(Stefan Collini ed., 1989). 
It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the 
general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, 
on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point, 
recognised by the current opinions.  This one branch is the Liberty of Thought: 
from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of 
writing. . . . [T]he grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they 
rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly 
appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been 
expected.  Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider 
application than to only one division of the subject . . . . 
Id. 
 13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see, e.g., Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38 
AKRON L. REV. 1, 49 (2005) (“The reasoning in Lawrence is very much of the same 
doctrinal variety as in Dred Scott and Lochner, even though—viewed as judicial 
legislation—the reasoning in Lawrence is far more reasonable and compassionate than 
that of either Dred Scott or Lochner.”) (footnote omitted).
 14. 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 15. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
 16. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 17. Cf. Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 18. The ACLU initially lost a great deal of support for defending the right of the 
Nazis to march, but that stand has come to be seen as true to the organization’s 
principles.  See, e.g., PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE (1999).   A 
unanimous body of judicial opinion recognizes, on First Amendment grounds, an 
exemption to Title VII for employment decisions regarding clergy.  See, e.g., Steven K. 
Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1, 23 (2002) (“[E]ven prior to the 1972 amendment, courts began to read a 
constitutionally compelled ‘ministerial exception’ into Title VII that allows religious 
institutions to discriminate on any basis—race, gender, national origin—for employment 
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the present consensus on the right to be let alone holds only across a 
limited range of the current hierarchy, contra Mill, we might also have a 
justification for an autonomy-based right of private discrimination.  On 
the other hand, if Mill was right and the current hierarchy is arbitrary, I 
expect Professor Zwolinski is correct to say that the right to discriminate 


























decisions involving clergy.”) (footnote omitted) (italics omitted).  As Cass Sunstein has 
pointed out, the Court’s holding in Lawrence was consistent with an overwhelming 
consensus in society at large.  Gay marriage is politically controversial, but the proposition 
that sexual activity behind closed doors among consenting adults ought to be beyond the 
reach of the criminal law is politically uncontroversial.  See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did 
Lawrence Hold?  Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 
27 (2004).  The overlap between the perceived scope of a right to discriminate, and the 
perceived scope of the right to freedom from coercive state regulation, seems very 
extensive if not, indeed, complete. 
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